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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article tackles the question of when a work
distributed over the Internet is published as a matter of
copyright law. Copyright publication doctrine retains
significant practical importance and can have a dispositive
impact on the economic value of a work. Publication can
also determine whether a court has jurisdiction over a
*
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Alfred Chueh-Chin Yen, and participants at the 2019 University of
New Hampshire Redux Conference and the 2019 Intellectual Property
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Taylor Townes for excellent research assistance.
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copyright claim. For many twentieth century works,
publication with observance of formalities was required if
copyrights were to attach to creative works at all.1
Publication remains relevant in determining the length of
copyright protection, but duration is far from the only
copyright issue that turns on this concept. The federal
Copyright Act repeatedly references publication for many
other purposes. Year by year, works dependent on the
publication doctrine for their duration are entering the
public domain. As the works of the twentieth century enter
the public domain, the issue of copyright publication will
fade from importance for purposes of duration analysis, and
the relative impact of the doctrine will be experienced more
forcefully with respect to other issues. Therefore, it is time
for research on the copyright publication doctrine to shift
its focus from duration to other copyright issues.

1

For those seeking clarity on this question, I conducted an empirical
study to identify the variables that lead courts to determine whether a
work is published. Both focus primarily on duration. The first of two
articles, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, reviews over a
century of copyright publication decisions decided between 1849 and
2009 and provides an overview of how publication doctrine affects
many significant issues in copyright law. Deborah R. Gerhardt,
Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
135 (2011). It explains how the meaning of copyright publication
affects a variety of different copyright issues including the citizenship
of the author, the duration of the copyright term, the availability of
statutory damages, infringement, and fair use. The second piece,
Copyright at the Museum: Using the Publication Doctrine to Free Art
and History, focuses on how copyright publication determines whether
original art, documents, photographs, and other cultural treasures are in
the public domain. Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright at the Museum:
Using the Publication Doctrine to Free Art and History, 61 J.
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 393 (2014). Both studies provide clarity on
how courts analyze the publication doctrine and how practitioners
should apply it to determine whether works have entered the public
domain.
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A precise understanding of copyright publication is
critical to optimizing the value of a work through the
copyright registration process. Practical decisions about
copyright publication must be decided by everyone trying
to optimize creative rights. When authors, musicians,
comedians, advertising professionals, artists, software
engineers, and corporations apply to register their
copyrights, they must specify if and when each work was
published.2 Correctly pinpointing the moment of copyright
publication and applying to register within three months of
that date trigger the availability of statutory damages and
attorney’s fees.3 Failure to register a United States work
eliminates the possibility of obtaining statutory damages,
but if a work is first published abroad, that rule does not
apply. The place of first publication triggers whether
timely registration is required. Consequently, the issue of
publication impacts the economic value of every
copyrighted work as dictated by U.S. law.
Because so many works are distributed on the
Internet, it is important to understand when such
distribution constitutes publication.
Unfortunately,
copyright law can appear hopelessly unclear on this basic
issue. The federal statutory definition of publication was
enacted in 1976, before the Internet existed, and therefore
does not address online distribution. The Copyright Office
guidelines raise the question without answering it.4
2

17 U.S.C. § 409(8) (2012).
See id. § 412.
4
See also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT
OFFICE
PRACTICES, §§
900–01
(2d
ed.
1984);
Copyright Office, Circular 66: Copyright Registration for Online
Works, p. 4 (Mar. 2019) (“Merely displaying or performing a work
online generally does not constitute publication. . . . However, a work is
considered published when the copyright owner offers to distribute
copies of the work to a group of people for the purpose of further
distributing the copies or publicly performing or displaying the work.
3
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Judicial efforts to clarify the issue are a mixed bag of
conflicting interpretations. This piece provides needed
clarity on the issue of when Internet distribution constitutes
publication.
Part I begins by summarizing the copyright
publication doctrine and explaining the roots of the
doctrine’s ambiguities. Part II seeks to reframe perception
of the doctrine as one related primarily to the duration of
twentieth century works. As publication fades from
importance for duration purposes, its import is increasing
for other purposes, such as the availability of statutory
damages and attorney’s fees, the validity of registrations,
country of origin, and fair use. Part III focuses on the
question of copyright publication on the Internet and
explains why this issue creates repeated daily challenges
for applicants seeking to register their works. Recent
decisions reach conflicting results on whether online
sharing constitutes publication. This Part reviews those
decisions, and critically examines the extent to which
copyright precedent supports their findings and analysis.
Part IV sets forth a standard for determining whether an
online distribution constitutes publication for copyright
The key element of publication for an online work is that the copyright
owner must authorize distribution. Just because an end user can
technically reproduce a work does not necessarily mean that the work
has been published. A copyright owner must have expressly or
implicitly authorized users to make retainable copies of a work by
downloading, printing, or other means for the work to be considered
published.
The concepts of authorization and publication can be complicated and
may have serious consequences for the author or copyright owner. For
this reason, the Office generally lets the applicant decide whether a
particular work is published or unpublished. In making this
determination, you may wish to consider the following general
guidelines.”).
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purposes. While the proposed standard does not answer
this fact-based question for all scenarios, it gives a muchneeded framework for determining whether the publication
question can be answered as a question of law, and if not,
where the factual inquiry should focus. The Article
concludes with an appeal to the U.S. Copyright Office,
treatise writers, and other leading copyright voices to apply
the proposed standard and share it with those seeking to
register copyrights in creative works in order to clarify the
recurrent issue of whether online distribution amounts to
copyright publication.
II.

AMBIGUITIES LATENT IN COPYRIGHT
PUBLICATION DOCTRINE

Copyright laws were originally designed for textual
works sold in hard-printed copies.5 The first U.S. copyright
statute applied only to books, maps, and charts.6 It was
then extended to visual works of fine art and sheet music.7
Later, protection was expanded to sound recordings and
architectural works.8 Before passage of the 1976 Act,
publication marked the beginning of protection.9 Even
5

Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1831) (“An
Act for the encouragement of learning, by securing the copies of maps,
charts, and books, to the authors and proprietors of such copies”).
6
Id.
7
Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, § 2, 4 Stat. 436 (repealed 1870).
8
Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (adding
copyrights “[t]o reproduce and distribute to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending, reproductions of
the copyrighted work if it be a sound recording”); Act of Dec. 1, 1990,
Pub. L. No, 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089, 5133 (adding “architectural
works” to copyright subject matter under section 102(a) of title 17,
United States Code).
9
See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (“Copyright in a work created on or after
January 1, 1978, subsists from its creation”); Acad. of Motion Picture
Arts & Scis. v. Creative House Promotions, Inc., 944 F.2d 1446, 1452
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before the Internet further complicated publication issues,
the definition created all kinds of doctrinal ambiguity.10 In
deciding whether Martin Luther King Jr.’s widely
publicized “I Have a Dream” speech was published and in
the public domain, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit observed that “‘publication’ is a ‘legal word of art,
denoting a process much more esoteric than is suggested by
the lay definition of the term.’”11 There were, however,
two points of clarity. Multiple sales of authorized copies
were clearly deemed publication.12 Mere display or
performance, with no distribution of any hard-copy version
of the work, did not amount to publication.13 Any factual
scenario that did not fit neatly into one of those two
extremes was not easily resolved.14 Mark Twain once
(9th Cir. 1991); Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Pub. Bldg.
Comm’n of Chicago, 320 F. Supp. 1303, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
10
See Werckmeister v. Am. Lithographic Co., 134 F. 321, 324 (2d Cir.
1904) (“Publication of a subject of copyright is effected by its
communication of dedication to the public. Such a publication is what
is known as a ‘general publication.’ There may be also a ‘limited
publication.’ The use of the word ‘publication’ in these two senses is
unfortunate and has led to much confusion.”); Thomas F. Cotter,
Toward a Functional Definition of Publication in Copyright Law, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1724, 1770 (2008) (“[T]he meaning of publication
remains, in many circumstances, fuzzy.”).
11
Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211,
1214 n.3 (11th Cir. 1999). For a more in-depth discussion of the other
two decisions deciding whether this speech was in the public domain as
well as the underlying facts, see Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright
Publication: An Empirical Study, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 143–
45 (2011).
12
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 4.03[A] at 4–24 (2011).
13
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (defining “copies,” “phonorecords,” “public
display,” “public performance,” “transfer of ownership,” and
“works.”).
14
McLaren v. Chico’s FAS, Inc., No. 10 CIV. 2481 JSR, 2010 WL
4615772, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010) (holding that the “claim that
images composing [Plaintiff’s] Collection were posted on her website
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wrote that, “[o]nly one thing is impossible for God: to find
any sense in any copyright law on the planet.”15 The
publication doctrine reflects the frustration many
experience in trying to make practical sense of copyright
law.
In the 1976 Copyright Act, Congress attempted to
clarify the doctrine developed by courts, defining
publication as:
[T]he distribution of copies or phonorecords
of a work to the public by sale or other
transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or
lending. The offering to distribute copies or
phonorecords to a group of persons for
purposes of further distribution, public
performance, or public display constitutes
publication.
A public performance
or display of a work does not of itself
constitute publication.16
One complexity inherent in this definition is that
many of its terms also have defined meanings particular to
would not in any event suffice to plead ‘publication’” as a matter of
law); Rogers v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc., 887 F.
Supp. 2d 722, 733 (S.D. Tex. 2012) (“[T]he court cannot hold, as a
matter of law, that the webpages were published unless public
distribution occurred. The court’s finding with regard to Defendant’s
failure to prove as a matter of law that posting the webpages on [a] . . .
website constituted a distribution at all, rendering the issue of selling or
licensing immaterial.”); Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d
189, 197 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“Making the work available [by posting it
on the Internet], even assuming it constituted ‘distribution,’ did not
involve ‘sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or
lending.’”).
15
MARK TWAIN, MARK TWAIN’s NOTEBOOK 381 (Albert Bigelow
Paine, ed., 1st ed. 1935).
16
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012) (emphasis added).
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copyright law. All of the italicized terms in the definition
reprinted above are specifically defined in the 1976
Copyright Act and further interpreted by federal courts and
the U.S. Copyright Office.17 As if this mesh of overlapping
defined terms weren’t enough, judicial interpretations of
the definition created additional complexities.
The publication definition had some gaping holes
that courts had to fill. For example, section 101 did not
clarify whether distribution by someone other than the
copyright owner would result in publication. That gap left
open the questions of whether (and if so, under what
circumstances) an unauthorized use or distribution can
result in publication of a copyrighted work. Such questions
resulted in complex balancing of many variables.
Even where the statute is crystal clear, judicial
interpretations muddied its impact. The statutory definition
states that publication occurs when one merely “offers to
distribute” copies.18 Literal application of this portion of
the definition might have resulted in publication of all
works made available to the public if the work was
deposited in any kind of public archive. The plain meaning
suggested by the statute was ignored by many federal
courts, who were reticent to find that copyright was lost
because someone deposited a copy of the work in a
government file in compliance with another federal or state
law. For example, courts have been reticent to divest
architectural copyrights when architectural plans were filed
in a public repository for zoning purposes.19 Such judicial
decisions conflicted with the literal text of the statute.
17

Id.
Id.
19
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright at the Museum: Using the
Publication Doctrine to Free Art and History, 61 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y
U.S.A. 393, 432–33 (2014).
18
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This conflict resulted from a statutory omission that
could have been foreseen. If Congress intended to hold a
mirror to the judicially-created publication doctrine in the
1976 Act,20 it did so only in part, as the statutory definition
failed to address whether “limited publication” to particular
persons for a specific purpose, without the right of
distribution to the public, amounted to publication. The
statute suggests that all such distributions are publications
because even a “rental, lease, or loan” is expressly deemed
a publication.21 If courts had applied the plain language of
the definition in this way, there would have been a clear
rule. All temporary transfers of ownership, in the form of
rental, lease, lending, or licensing, would amount to
publication. Instead, courts doubled down on the limited
publication doctrine, creating a conflict with the plain
meaning of the statute.
Before 1976, all authors who published their works
without affixing a copyright notice lost their copyrights
upon publication.22 The harsh consequences of the statute
fed the public domain, but also trapped unwary authors into

20

See 17 U.S.C. § 405(a); Cotter, supra note 10, at 1771 (“[The 1976
Act’s] definition [of publication] is said to largely track the meaning of
the term as developed in the pre-1976 case law.”); W. Russel Taber,
Copyright Déjà Vu: A New Definition of “Publication” Under the
Copyright Act of 1909, 58 VAND. L. REV. 857, 875 (2005) (“[The 1976
Act’s] definition [of publication] is generally considered a codification
of the common law.”); 1 Nimmer & Nimmer, supra note 12, § 4.03
(“[T]he 1976 Act definition [of publication] has been held to constitute
a codification of the definition evolved by case law prior to adoption of
the current Act.”).
21
17 U.S.C. § 101.
22
In the 1976 Act, Congress softened the consequences, created the
ability to cure a deficient notice, and did away with the notice
requirement completely when the copyright statute was revised to
comply with the Berne treaty in 1989.
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unintentionally losing their copyrights.23 In an effort to
minimize the harsh consequences of the formality
requirements, courts developed the doctrine of limited
publication.24 If a work was distributed only to a discrete
23

See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 9, 35 Stat. 1075, 1077 (repealed
1976) (providing that “[a]ny person entitled thereto by this Act may
secure copyright for his work by publication thereof with the notice of
copyright required by this Act; and such notice shall be affixed to each
copy thereof published or offered for sale in the United States by
authority of the copyright proprietor”); see 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012)
(expanding copyright protection to “original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated”); see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (bestowing unto the copyright
owner the exclusive rights to “reproduce the copyrighted work,”
“prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,”
“distribute copies . . . to the public,” “perform the copyrighted work
publicly,” “display the copyrighted work publicly,” and “perform the
copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio transmission” in
the case of a sound recording); see 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (extending
copyright term to the “life of the author and 70 years after the author’s
death”); see The Law: Righting Copyright, TIME, Nov. 1, 1976, at 82
(“‘All in all,’ says Barbara Ringer, the U.S. Register of Copyrights,
‘[the Copyright Act of 1976] is a balanced compromise that comes
down on the authors’ and creators’ side in almost every instance.’”).
24
See Ladd v. Oxnard, 75 F. 703, 731 (C.C.D. Mass. 1896) (“The
determinations of various courts that, under some circumstances, the
delivery of lectures, or the representation of plays, to such of the public
as may attend, do not constitute publication, must be regarded as rather
of an incidental character, arising undoubtedly to some extent from
tenderness for authors, and not establishing any general rule.”); Keene
v. Wheatley, 14 F. Cas. 180, 199 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1861) (No. 7664) (“A
limited publication of it is an act which communicates a knowledge of
the contents to a select few, upon conditions expressly or impliedly
precluding its rightful ulterior communication, except in restricted
private intercourse.”); see Jane C. Ginsburg, The U.S. Experience with
Mandatory Copyright Formalities: A Love/Hate Relationship, 33
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 311, 323 (“‘Unpublished,’ however, did not mean
unexploited or undivulged. Public performance of a work did not
‘publish’ it, and therefore did not subject it to formalities, even if the
performed work had been widely seen. Borrowing from old English
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group of people for a limited purpose by means that did not
permit further distribution to the public, such a “limited
publication” did not divest a claimant of his or her
copyright.25 Broader distributions to the public, deemed
“general publication,” were still equated with publication,
but a work distributed in a “limited publication” was
treated as though it had not been published at all.26
Development of this paternalistic doctrine was designed to
protect authors and artists from the harsh consequences of
the formality requirements, which it did.27 But it further
complicated the publication doctrine, defanging some
portions of the statute and pulling many works back from
falling into the public domain.
decisions holding that a public performance was not a ‘publication,’
U.S. courts elaborated a parallel universe of ‘unpublished’ works. The
rather strained notion of publication was motivated in large part by
courts’ awareness that, were the work to be deemed ‘published,’ and
had the author not complied with all applicable federal statutory
formalities, the work would go into the public domain, and all
protection, state or federal, would be lost.” (citations omitted)).
25
White v. Kimmell, 193 F.2d 744, 746–47 (9th Cir. 1952) (explaining
that a limited publication “communicates the contents of a [work] . . .
to a definitely selected group and for a limited purpose, and without the
right of diffusion, reproduction, distribution or sale . . . [and] does not
result in loss of the author’s common-law right to his [work]. . . . [T]he
circulation must be restricted both as to persons and purpose, or it
cannot be called a private or limited publication.”).
26
Id.
27
See Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1026–27 (9th Cir.
1981) (“Case law has created a distinction between general and limited
publication, holding that only the former operates to divest common
law copyright and subject a work to the federal statutory scheme.”);
Theresa Gue, Triggering Infection: Distribution and Derivative Works
Under the Gnu General Public License, 110 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. &
POL’Y 95 (2012) (“If [an author] . . . published a work without proper
notice, he lost both common law and federal copyright protection, and
the work was placed into the public domain. Courts differentiated
between limited publication and general publication in order to mitigate
the harshness of this rule.”).
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Judicial treatment of the distribution of feature films
illustrates how the limited publication doctrine was
employed to justify results that contradict the plain
language of the statute. Before digital distribution, studios
would send theaters a hard copy of a film with the
requirement that the work be returned after the run.28
According to the statute, this distribution should amount to
publication. This result would not be due to the public
showing of the film because the statute unambiguously
states that public performance is not publication.29
However, the statutory definition also states that a “rental,
lease or loan” amounts to publication.30 Based on this
language, the studio’s temporary transfer of film reels to
movie houses would constitute publication of the film.
And if the studio failed to affix a copyright notice, those
films would be part of the public domain. Given the clear
statutory implications of this fact pattern and those similar
to it, courts devised the “limited publication” doctrine to
soften the effects of the statute and save these works from
the consequences of inadvertent publication.31
The
contradictory signals from the statute and the case law, not
28

See Am. Vitagraph, 659 F.2d at 1025 (“In December of 1975
Vitagraph delivered to Levy a print of their initial version of the film
. . . That print was screened to the public for one week . . . and
subsequently returned to Vitagraph for additional editing.”).
29
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
30
Id.
31
Soc’y of the Holy Transfiguration Monastery, Inc. v. Gregory, 689
F.3d 29, 44–46 (1st Cir. 2012) (holding that distribution of translations
of religious texts to other parishes for use in worship and for editorial
feedback was limited publication); Am. Vitagraph, 659 F.2d at 1027–28
(holding that a temporary screening of a film reel for the purposes of
audience feedback followed by the theater returning the reel was
limited publication); Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs., Ltd. v. Bloomberg
L.P., 756 F.3d 73, 87–89 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that a recording of a
conference call between a corporation’s management and 132 invited
analysts was statutorily unpublished).
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uncommon in copyright law, added to the publication
doctrine’s lack of clarity.
The complexities only worsen in the age of the
Internet. If distribution in cyberspace merely constitutes a
public performance or display, it will not be considered
publication. Under this portion of the definition, works
distributed over the Internet may still be unpublished.
However, if the Internet permits anyone to access copies or
phonorecords of the work, the copyright owner who posts a
work online is providing the public with access to copies,
and therefore, the statutory definition indicates that the
work has been published.
III.

THE ENDURING SIGNIFICANCE OF COPYRIGHT
PUBLICATION

Some may question whether publication remains
worthy of attention for contemporary works. Any work
created after 1989 is not vulnerable to losing its copyright
protection through publication without a properly
constructed copyright notice.32 Nonetheless, copyright
publication remains critically significant at multiple
moments in the life of a copyrighted work. As more
distributions occur in cyberspace, determining whether
Internet dissemination amounts to publication retains
practical significance for many issues tied to the economic
value of creative works.
Pinpointing the moment of copyright publication is
a practical necessity for everyone seeking to secure the
benefits of copyright registration in the United States.
Hundreds of thousands of copyright registration
applications are filed in the U.S. Copyright Office each
32

17 U.S.C. § 405(a) (1988).

Volume 60 – Number 1

14 IDEA – The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property
year. Although the Copyright Office does not provide
access to bulk data as the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
does, Dotan Oliar, Nathaniel Pattison, and K. Ross Powell
collected five years of data, and found that 2.3 million
copyright registrations were granted between 2008 and
2012.33 For U.S. authors, registration is required before a
federal court has jurisdiction to decide an infringement
claim.34
An understanding of publication is necessary to
register a work because publication is one of the questions
of fact that must be entered on each application.35 For
example, a photographer may save on filing fees by
registering a group of works for fifty-five dollars instead of
paying thirty-five dollars to register each work.36 In order
to do so, all photos in the group must have identical
publication data. They must all be either published or
unpublished—and if published, they all must have been
published in the same calendar year.37
Given the importance of publication to the
registration process, one might expect the Copyright Office
to give applicants meaningful guidance on whether Internet
distribution constitutes publication. Unfortunately, the
33

Dotan Oliar, Nathaniel Pattison & K. Ross Powell, Copyright
Registrations: Who, What, When, Where, and Why, 92 TEX. L. REV.
2211, 2213 (2014).
34
See 17 U.S.C. § 411(b) (1990); Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559
U.S. 154, 157 (2010); PRC Realty, Sys., Inc. v. Nat’l. Ass’n of
Realtors, Inc., 766 F. Supp. 453, 461 (E.D. Va. 1991) (“The registration
is, after all, merely the plaintiff’s ‘ticket’ to court; the protection of the
copyright arises at the time of the creation of the work.”).
35
See 17 U.S.C. § 409(8) (1992).
36
37 C.F.R. § 202.4(i)(6) (2018); U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, https
://www.copyright.gov/about/fees.html [https://perma.cc/D3UZUSRB]
(last visited Sep. 26, 2019).
37
37 C.F.R. § 202.4(h)–(i).
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Copyright Office does not currently provide this service.
Instead, it continues its “long-standing practice” of leaving
it up to “the applicant, who knows the facts surrounding
distribution of copies of a work, to determine whether the
work is published or not.”38 If anything in the statement of
facts contradicts a publication conclusion in the
Application, the Copyright Office will not register the
work.39 Mistakes often pass through the ministerial
copyright registration process and can come back to haunt
authors later.
This practice would not be problematic if the
publication doctrine tracked the lay understanding of the
word “publication.” Unfortunately, it does not. The
copyright meaning of publication is counterintuitive in
many respects. Copyright publication does not occur each
time the public gains access to a work. Public performance
and display are expressly excluded from amounting to
publication. Conversely, relatively private conduct such as
the unconditional sale of a single copy, the offering to sell
copies to the public, or the temporary loan of a copy may
amount to publication.40 Given these anomalies, more
guidance is necessary. The standard set forth in Part IV
begins to fill this gap and assist applicants in making
correct publication conclusions about Internet distribution.
Copyright registration applications may be
completed without the assistance of counsel. Given the
counterintuitive meaning of publication in copyright law, it
would be most helpful if the Copyright Office provided
38

Copyright Office, Circular 66: Copyright Registration for Online
Works, p. 3; see also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S.
COPYRIGHT OFFICE PRACTICES, § 904(1) (2d ed. 1984).
39
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES, § 904(5) (2d ed. 1984).
40
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
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user-friendly FAQ’s or instructional videos on this issue.
At a minimum, the Office could identify examples of sales
and common Internet distributions that would or would not
constitute publication.
Federal copyright registration, when done correctly,
can confer substantial benefits at minimal cost. A valid
federal copyright registration constitutes prima facie
evidence of the validity of all the facts found in the
certificate, including the validity of the copyright, the date
of first publication, and ownership.41
Getting the publication date wrong can ruin an
otherwise strong copyright claim. In JMAS Enterprises,
Inc. v. Kassir Import-Export Co.,42 the plaintiffs claimed a
first publication date of 2009. That date was wrong.
Plaintiffs had no evidence to support publication in 2009.43
They admitted they did not create their website until 2010
and did not begin marketing the work until January 2011,
well after the 2009 publication date claimed in their
copyright application.44 Even though their substantive
infringement claim was strong, the court denied their claim
for a preliminary injunction—all because they were not
able to substantiate their claimed publication date.45 Had
they used a correct date or filed for copyright for their
design as an unpublished work, the outcome may have been
different. This decision provides an important cautionary
lesson. Getting the publication date or status wrong can be
fatal to an otherwise strong copyright claim.
41

Id. § 410.
JMAS Enterprises, Inc. v. Kassir Imp.-Exp. Co., No. CV 11-06258
SVW (PJW), 2011 WL 13221007, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 2011).
43
Id. at *4.
44
Id.
45
Id. at *5 (“Assuming that Plaintiffs are able to establish a valid
copyright, they likely could establish infringement.”).
42
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Another important mistake to avoid in the
registration process is grouping works that were published
in different years. The Copyright Office regulations
sometimes permit authors or photographers to register a
group of works and avoid paying multiple registration fees
but only if the entirety falls within industry-specific
definitions of an acceptable group or constitutes “a single
unit of publication.”46 In either case, all works in the group
must have been published in the same calendar year.47 In
McLaren v. Chico’s FAS, Inc., a designer attempted to
benefit from this provision by registering a group of
twenty-four drawings.48 Two years before the claimed
publication date, she sold some of the drawings.49 The
court determined that this prior sale amounted to
publication. Because some of the drawings were not
published in the same year as claimed in the application,
the registration for the group was invalidated, and an
otherwise viable copyright claim was dismissed.50 Getting
the publication dates right and paying the additional modest
registration fees are a small price to pay to preserve the
economic value of such copyrightable works. Both JMAS
Enterprises, Inc. v. Kassir Import-Export Co. and McLaren
v. Chico’s FAS, Inc. illustrate how important it is to fill in
the publication information correctly when applying to
register a copyright. Completing the application correctly
requires understanding the particular meaning of copyright
publication.

46

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES §§ 1107–1107.1 (3d ed. 2017).
47
Id. at § 1107.1.
48
McLaren v. Chico’s FAS, Inc., No. 10-cv-2481 (JSR), 2010 WL
4615772, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010).
49
Id.
50
Id. at *3–4.
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The timing of publication and registration may also
dramatically impact the economic value of a copyrighted
work. A copyright owner who gets the timing right can
obtain statutory damages and attorney’s fees in an
infringement suit.51 Statutory damages can be as high as
$150,000 per act of infringement.52 In addition to
heightening the potential economic recovery of winning an
infringement claim, the settlement value of a copyright
claim may significantly increase if heightened damages are
available. Registration before infringement, or within three
months of first publication, dictates whether such
extraordinary remedies are available.53 A copyright owner
who understands these remedies will see that there is a
powerful economic incentive to register within three
months of publication. Even if actual damages exceed the
statutory damages amount, the litigation costs of proving
the economic value of damages combined with the
possibility of obtaining attorney’s fees may make it more
cost efficient to claim the statutory remedies.
Copyright registration data suggests that many
applicants are unaware of the significant benefits that result
from timely copyright registration. Hundreds of thousands
51

17 U.S.C. § 412 (2008).
17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2010) (“In any action under this title . . . no
award of statutory damages or of attorney’s fees, as provided by
sections 504 and 505, shall be made for—
(1) any infringement of copyright in an unpublished work commenced
before the effective date of its registration; or
(2) any infringement of copyright commenced after first publication of
the work and before the effective date of its registration, unless such
registration is made within three months after the first publication of
the work.”) (emphasis added).
53
Alaska Stock, LLC v. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Pub. Co., 747 F.3d
673, 678 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 412 to explain that
“registration prior to infringement or, if the work is published, within
three months of publication, is necessary for an owner to obtain
statutory damages and attorneys’ fees.”).
52
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of works are registered each year, many for groups of
works.54 From 2008 to 2012, 54.6% of applicants filed to
register their copyrights within three months of publication,
and only .02% of works were registered as unpublished.
These two groups optimized the economic value of their
registrations. The remaining 45% of applications were
filed more than three months after publication.55 That
delay cost them the opportunity to recover statutory
damages and attorney’s fees. These applicants could have
substantially increased the economic value of their
copyrights by registering within three months of first
publication.
In order to successfully plead a claim for statutory
damages and attorney’s fees, a copyright plaintiff must
identify the dates of (1) first publication; (2) copyright
registration; and (3) the alleged infringement.
The
registration must also precede publication or be effective56
within three months of first publication.57 If the dates are
not properly pled, or if the timing does not fit the
requirements of the statute, a defendant may obtain
dismissal of the claim for statutory damages and attorney’s
fees, defanging the economic threat of the suit and
54

See 2018 U.S. Copyright Office Ann. Rep. Reg. Copyright, 21
(showing an average of 527,380 registrations per year dating back to
2008. However, Oliar, Patteson, and Powell note that it is important to
remember “that there is no simple one-to-one relationship between the
number of registrations and the number of works registered therein.”).
Oliar, Patteson & Powell, supra note 33, at 2243.
55
Oliar, Patteson & Powell, supra note 33, at 2230 (explaining that
54.6% are registered within three months of publication, while only
.02% are registered while still unpublished).
56
17 U.S.C. § 410(d) (1976) (“The effective date of registration is the
day on which an application, deposit, and fee, which are later
determined by the Register of Copyrights or by a court of competent
jurisdiction to be acceptable for registration, have all been received in
the Copyright Office.”).
57
17 U.S.C. § 412(2) (2008).
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substantially increasing the cost of litigation for the
plaintiff.58
Publication is also important in identifying a work’s
nation of origin, and whether compliance with U.S.
formalities is necessary. For example, registration with the
U.S. Copyright Office is required for federal jurisdiction
over claims asserting copyright infringement of a “United
States work.”59 Pursuant to one of the copyright provisions
that favors international applicants, owners of foreign
works need not comply with this provision.60 While a
“United States work” must be registered before a copyright
infringement suit is filed, the registration requirement is
waived for foreign works. “Thus, to proceed with a
58

Olivares v. Univ. of Chicago, 213 F. Supp. 3d 757, 772–73
(M.D.N.C. 2016) (granting Defendants’ motion to strike and dismissing
Plaintiff’s requests for statutory damages and attorney’s fees for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the
infringement occurred before registration); Hoffman v. 0 Three Media,
LLC, No. CV 12-60-GW(JEMX), 2012 WL 12886181, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
Nov. 27, 2012) (granting summary judgment on unavailability
of statutory damages or attorney’s fees for this copyright claim
“because the photograph was unpublished at the time the alleged
infringement occurred, and the alleged infringement occurred prior to
the copyright registration.”).
59
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (“For purposes of section 411, a work is
a ‘United States work’ only if— (1) in the case of a published work, the
work is first published— (A) in the United States . . . ”); 17 U.S.C. §
411(a) (2017) (“[N]o civil action for infringement of the copyright in
any United States work shall be instituted until preregistration or
registration of the copyright claim has been made in accordance with
this title.”); Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666 F. Supp. 2d 415, 420 (D. Del.
2009) (holding that “because plaintiff’s photographs did not originate
in the United States, they are not subject to the registration requirement,
and such a formality is not a prerequisite to suit”).
60
Moberg, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 420 (“The effect of the United States’
accession to the [Berne] Convention ‘is to exempt works the country of
origin of which is not the United States from the registration
requirement.’”) (quoting Cotter, supra note 10, at 1743).
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copyright infringement action, a plaintiff that claims his
published work is exempt from the registration requirement
must prove that the first publication occurred abroad.”61
The timing and place of first publication must be
determined before a work can be classified as a “United
States work” or foreign work.62 As the creative world
becomes increasingly international, the publication doctrine
will trigger whether a creative piece is considered a
“United States work,” which may be subject to different
copyright formality requirements.
Similarly, while a “United States work”
permanently enters the public domain for failure to observe
formalities, certain foreign works can recover their
copyright protections.63 Pursuant to this provision, many
61

Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1304–05 (11th Cir.
2012) (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 411(a)); Latimer v. Roaring Toyz,
Inc., 601 F.3d 1224, 1233 (11th Cir. 2010); BUC Int’l Corp. v. Int’l
Yacht Council, Ltd., 489 F.3d 1129, 1141–42 (11th Cir. 2007).
62
Kernel Records Oy, 694 F.3d at 1304 (“Determining whether a work
was first published domestically or abroad adds an additional level of
complexity. Because the statutory definition of ‘United States work’
contains strict temporal and geographic requirements (e.g., ‘first,’
‘simultaneously,’ ‘in the United States,’ ‘foreign nation,’ and ‘treaty
party’) a determination that a work was first published abroad requires
both: (1) an examination of the method, extent, and purpose of the
alleged distribution to determine whether that distribution was
sufficient for publication, and (2) an examination of both the timing
and geographic extent of the first publication to determine whether the
work was published abroad.” (citations omitted)).
63
17 U.S.C. § 104A(h)(6) (2002).
The term “restored work” means an original work of authorship that-(A) is protected under subsection (a);
(B) is not in the public domain in its source country through expiration
of term of protection;
(C) is in the public domain in the United States due to-(i) noncompliance with formalities imposed at any time by United
States copyright law, including failure of renewal, lack of proper
notice, or failure to comply with any manufacturing requirements;
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popular musical works such as Prokofiev’s Peter and the
Wolf (which was in the public domain prior to the
enactment of 17 U.S.C. § 104(A)) can no longer be played
by orchestras without seeking a license or risking
infringement. The time and place of first publication
triggers whether the work is considered a “United States
work” or a work from another source country.64
Authors who want to optimize their creative rights
must promptly register copyrights in works first published
in the United States. If an author incorrectly enters the date
of publication in its copyright application, the entire
registration may be later invalidated.65 Such a result can be
fatal to an otherwise strong copyright infringement claim
because registration is a prerequisite for federal jurisdiction
if the work was first published in the United States.66
For all of these reasons, the importance of
understanding copyright publication should not be
underestimated.
Publication triggers many important
moments in the life of a creative work. Because so many
(D) has at least one author or rightholder who was, at the time the work
was created, a national or domiciliary of an eligible country, and
if published, was first published in an eligible country and
not published in the United States during the 30-day period following
publication in such eligible country;
(E) If the source country for the work is an eligible country solely by
virtue of its adherence to the WIPO Performances and Phonograms
Treaty, is a sound recording.
64
See id. § 101.
65
KEMA, Inc. v. Koperwhats, No. C-09-1587 MMC, 2010 WL
3464737, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2010) (“A copyright plaintiff will
not satisfy the registration requirement where the allegedly infringed
work was published before the date of first publication identified in the
registration, unless such registration identifies the registered work as
derivative of, or a compilation containing, the allegedly infringed
work.”)
66
17 U.S.C. § 411.
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works are shared online, the following section explains
how these ambiguities may be resolved for online
distributions.
IV.

INTERNET PUBLICATION

Once one appreciates the significance of
publication, it becomes apparent why it is so important to
confront whether online distribution amounts to
publication. If posting a work on the Internet is considered
the distribution of copies, it is publication, but if posting is
mere display or performance, it is not publication. The
Copyright Office dodges the question. Its Compendium
suggests that online works may be published or
unpublished and leaves it to the applicant to make that
distinction, without helpful guidance.67 In short, it raises
the question of whether distribution on the Internet
constitutes publication but does not answer it.
After hunting through the Compendium’s labyrinth
for help, applicants may ultimately think they’ve found the
answer when they arrive at a subsection on “websites and
website content” titled, “What Constitutes Publication?”
When they begin reading that section, they will be told that
“while technological developments have blurred this
traditional concept, the U.S. Copyright Office interprets
publication in a manner consistent with congressional
intent and with appreciation for the current factual and
legal distinctions that may inform the assessment of this
issue.”68
In some sections, the Compendium may lead one to
wonder whether dissemination of mere digital copies can
amount to publication. For example, one section states that
67
68

COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 1008.6(A)-(B).
Id. at § 1008.3(A).
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“any form or dissemination in which a material object does
not change hands . . . is not a publication no matter how
many people are exposed to the work.”69 This passage
reflects legislative history that was articulated at a time
before the Internet existed. For decades, it has been wellsettled that digital duplicates of a work constitute “copies”
within the meaning of copyright law.70 A physical material
object need not exist for publication to occur. This
outdated statement should be removed from the
Compendium because it is misleading to suggest that
digital copies cannot result in publication.
Other sections of the Compendium confirm that it is
not necessary for the public to actually put hands on
physical copies. It offers the following examples of digital
distribution that constitute publication:
[A] book is published when copies of the
work are distributed online or in bookstores. A newspaper is distributed when
copies are sold at newsstands or delivered to
subscribers’ doorsteps. A song is distributed
when print copies or phonorecords are sold
(e.g., on sheet music or in mp3 format).
Software is distributed when copies are
distributed by purchase or license, whether
in CD-ROM format or online (provided that

69

Id. at § 1905.2 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 138 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5754.)
70
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913, 928–29 (2005) (basing its decision on the factual foundation that
digital sharing is tantamount to infringement); MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak
Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that “it is
generally accepted that the loading of software into a computer
constitutes the creation of a copy under the Copyright Act.”).
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the copies are actually downloaded and not
merely accessed online).71
From this passage, a reader may conclude that all
online distributions constitute publication.
But the
Compendium leaves room for the possibility that
distribution on the Internet may not amount to copyright
publication.
For example, it tracks the publication
definition by stating that if “the content was placed online
solely for the purpose of public display or public
performance, the work may be deemed unpublished.”72 In
this way, the Compendium gives its readers reasons to
believe both that online distribution may be either
publication or mere display or performance (which does not
amount to publication) and leaves its readers with no
guidance on how to tell the difference.
To further complicate the issue, the Copyright
Office guidelines also incorporate the doctrine of limited
publication, indicating in one example that “a draft
dissertation or other manuscript that is sent [presumably by
email or some other electronic method] to a dozen people
for peer review with a note stating that the copy should not
be shared with other parties is not considered
publication.”73 This example may raise questions about
how to treat works when online distribution provides access
to a work even if the work is not sold. Is such content
merely displayed and performed, but not published? The
statute indicates that any transfer—even a loan—may
constitute publication.74 Therefore, the price tag alone
cannot dictate the answer. And what about content that is
made available only if one first becomes a member of a
71
72
73
74

COMPENDIUM (THIRD) § 612.2.
Id. at § 1108.6(B).
Id. at § 612.2.
17 U.S.C. § 101.
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password-protected website? Should limited access make a
difference? After wading through the Compendium and
statutory publication definition, one is left frustrated as
neither adequately explain how to determine if a work was
published if it was distributed, but not sold, on the Internet.
Greater clarity is needed so that authors know how to apply
to register works they distribute online such as photographs
uploaded to Instagram, videos one can view on YouTube,
or articles shared for no charge on Facebook.
The ambiguity of whether such works are published
has confounded courts as well.75 In 2002, the Southern
District of New York was the first to confront this issue
directly in Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi.76 Getaped
created a website to sell motorized scooters.77 The site
went live in July 2000, and a month later, the company
registered its copyright in the code for the site.78 The
defendants, who were competitors in the scooter market,
copied the code for their own site.79 The defendants did not
show up to defend themselves on liability, and default
judgment was entered for Getaped.80 However, Cangemi
did hire counsel to dispute the issue of damages.81 A
magistrate judge held that the source code was merely
displayed on the site, and not published.82 Therefore, the
judge recommended that the district court enter only $1,050

75

See Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 402
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189,
197 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
76
188 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
77
Id. at 399.
78
Id. at 400.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 401.
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in actual damages based on a theory of lost licensing
revenue.83
The district court thoughtfully considered whether
the code was merely displayed and identified a critical
distinction in separating published from unpublished
works. The court indicated that when one can view a work
but not make a copy, it is merely displayed and not
published, but when one can obtain a copy, it is
published.84 The court reasoned:
By accessing a webpage, the user not only
views the page but can also view—and
copy—the code used to create it. In other
words, merely by accessing a webpage, an
Internet user acquires the ability to make a
copy of that webpage, a copy that is, in fact,
indistinguishable in every part from the
original. Consequently, when a website
goes live, the creator loses the ability to
control either duplication or further
distribution of his or her work. A webpage
in this respect is indistinguishable from
photographs, music files or software posted
on the web—all can be freely copied. Thus,
when a webpage goes live on the Internet, it
is distributed and “published” in the same
way the music files in Napster or the
photographs
in
the
various Playboy
decisions
were
distributed
and
“published.”85

83
84
85

Id. at 400.
Id. at 401–02.
Id.
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More than a century of publication precedent is
consistent with the conclusion in Getaped. Digital files
have been deemed to be copies.86 My empirical study
indicates that the existence of copies authorized by the
copyright owner is a significant variable that often leads to
a conclusion of publication.87 Accordingly, one might
conclude that public digital distribution by the copyright
owner will generally lead to a conclusion that the work has
been published. Other courts have questioned whether
distribution on the Internet constitutes publication,88 but a
close look at the facts of each of them indicates that their
reasoning does not undermine the basic conclusion of
Getaped.89
The decision in McLaren v. Chico’s FAS, Inc.,90 has
been cited repeatedly in footnotes as an example of a court
86

17 U.S.C. § 1001; London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1, 542 F. Supp.
2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008) (“[A]ny object in which a sound recording
can be fixed is a ‘material object.’ That includes . . . electronic files.”);
Sara Steetle, UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc.: Signaling the
Need for a Deeper Analysis of Copyright Infringement of Digital
Recordings, 21 LOY. OF L.A. ENT. L. REV. 31, 40 (2000) (“Works in
digital form are considered ‘copies’ under the Copyright Act.”).
87
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study, 87
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 184–92 (2011) (“The principal factor
driving the publication determination turns out to be whether copies are
authorized for distribution. Whatever impact the public availability of
copies may appear to have on its own, that influence is subsumed by
the presence of authorized copies. In short, district court judges are
relying principally upon the copyright owner’s consent, not the
availability of copies to the general public, when rendering their
judgments.”).
88
See generally Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1308
(11th Cir. 2012); Rogers v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc.,
887 F. Supp. 2d 722, 730 (S.D. Tex. 2012); Moberg v. 33T LLC, 666
F. Supp. 2d 415, 422 (D. Del. 2009).
89
See McLaren v. Chico’s FAS, Inc., No. 10-cv-2481 (JSR), 2010 WL
4615772, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2010).
90
Id.
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that reached a conclusion contrary to Getaped. Although
the court questioned in dicta whether Internet distribution
always amounts to publication, the decision is based on a
different issue. Chesley McLaren sued Chico’s, claiming
the retailer of women’s clothing displayed mannequins that
infringed her copyrighted designs.91 Prior to filing the
complaint, she applied for copyright registration in a
collection of her drawings.92 Her registrations did not
reflect a clear understanding of publication rules.
Normally, each work must be registered separately. 93 Some
exceptions permit publication of a group of certain works
(such as photographs and serials) published in the same
calendar year.94 Drawings do not fit neatly into any of those
exceptions, and therefore, they can only be registered as a
group if they were published as one “unit of publication”
on the same day.95 In McLaren, although the group of
drawings was distributed online at the same time, some of
the drawings had been licensed prior to the alleged
publication date.96 Based on these facts, the court correctly
concluded that the license amounted to publication, and
therefore, the entire group was not first published on the
same day as claimed in the registration.97 On that basis, the
court invalidated the registration. The designer’s counsel
argued that before the sale, she had published the whole
collection by posting it online, but no date or
documentation were provided to substantiate this
conclusory allegation.98 Accordingly, the court explained:
91

Id. at *1.
Id.
93
U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COMPENDIUM OF U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE
PRACTICES, § 1101.
94
Id. at § 1104.
95
Id. at § 1103.
96
McLaren, 2010 WL 4615772, at *2.
97
Id.
98
Id.
92
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[T]he amended complaint provides no
indication of when that website was posted
and gives no details regarding how the
images from the Collection were displayed,
thus rendering this allegation little more than
conclusory. Moreover, even if the factual
aspect of this allegation were credited, this
claim that images composing the Collection
were posted on her website would not in any
event suffice to plead “publication.”
Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that
website posting can amount to publication,
there is no basis to conclude that this alleged
publication represented the first time that
any of the illustrations in the Collection was
published, and for that reason, this new
allegation fails to alter the conclusion that
the Collection does not qualify for a “single
work” registration.99
Before citing this precedent for the principle that
Internet distribution does not constitute publication,
litigants should be mindful of the fact that the court stated it
did not have the factual predicate to decide the case on this
issue. Instead, the court based its conclusion on the facts it
had and found that the entire group did not have the same
publication date because some of the drawings were sold,
and therefore published, before the claimed publication
date for the entire set.100

99

Id. at *4 (citing Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189,
197 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) for the proposition that “‘merely posting a
digital file’ on the Internet does not amount to ‘publication’ under the
Copyright Act.”).
100
Id.
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When analyzing the issue of Internet publication,
the McLaren court cites Einhorn v. Mergatroyd
Productions, which does address the issue of when Internet
distribution may constitute publication. In Einhorn, the
director of an “Off Off Broadway” show entitled Tam Lin
claimed to have created copyrightable “blocking and
choreography” for the production of a play that was
performed eight times.101 The director was fired before the
show opened, and did not get paid, so he sued the
production company claiming he was promised $1,000 for
his work.102 He attempted to register a copyright in his
contributions, using an edited copy of the playwright’s
script, but he failed to identify exactly what his original
contributions were.103 Before addressing the motion to
dismiss, Judge Kaplan began the opinion with his overall
impression of the matter. He wrote, “We speak of ‘making
a federal case’ out of something to express the sentiment
that someone is blowing something out of proportion.
Plaintiff Edward Einhorn, represented by his attorney
brother, has made this federal case out of a dispute over
$1,000.”104 Plaintiff sought statutory damages claiming that
publication of his work occurred when the Defendants
performed the play and posted images of the show on their
website.105 The court easily disposed of the first claim
based on the statutory definition of publication that
expressly excludes public performance.106 That portion of
the conclusion is indisputably correct.
The court then proceeded to determine whether the
Defendant published the play when it posted a performance
101
102
103
104
105
106

Einhorn, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 191–93.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
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on the Internet. The court determined that it did not. It
reasoned:
The same definition dooms Einhorn’s claim
that the posting of performances of the show
on the Internet constituted publication, even
assuming arguendo that Einhorn may rely
upon defendants’ actions, some of which are
said to have infringed his alleged rights, to
establish publication. Making the work
available in that way, even assuming it
constituted “distribution,” did not involve
“sale or other transfer of ownership, or by
rental, lease or lending.” Indeed, this result
follows directly from the principle that “the
projection or exhibition of a motion picture
in theaters or elsewhere does not in itself
constitute a publication.”107
The court in Einhorn arrived at the correct
conclusion, but its reasoning is flawed. The court should
have clarified that distribution by the Defendants could not
amount to publication because, generally, only distributions
authorized by the copyright owner constitute publication,
and this distribution was clearly not authorized.108
The question of authorization was a significant
factor leading to the determination that the song “Happy
Birthday” belongs in the public domain.109 The district
court correctly noted that “[i]f the publication was
107

Einhorn, 426 F. Supp. 2d at 197 (quoting 1 Nimmer & Nimmer,
supra note 12, § 4.11[A]).
108
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 200 (2011).
109
Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 975, 990–
91 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
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authorized, that could make it a general publication . . .
divesting the Hill sisters of their common law copyright”
due to the lack of notice required at the time of
publication.110 When a public distribution has not been
authorized, it will not weigh as heavily in favor of
publication.111 A defendant cannot prove publication based
solely on an act of infringement.112 However, if a copyright
owner permits obvious public distribution without doing
anything to control it, a general publication may occur
notwithstanding a lack of express permission.113 Had the
Einhorn court emphasized that unauthorized distributions
do not amount to publication, the conclusion would have
been based on a sound foundation of copyright publication
precedent.
To the extent that the court suggests that Internet
distribution does not amount to transfer of ownership of a
copy, the decision contradicts Getaped. The Einhorn court
suggested that for publication purposes, Internet
distribution of a film was equivalent to the screening of a
film in a theater,114 but that is a false equivalency. When a
110

Id. at 991.
Id. at 990.
112
Neri v. Monroe, No. 11-cv-429-slc, 2014 WL 793336, at *10 (W.D.
Wis. Feb. 26, 2014), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 465 (7th Cir. 2014) (“For
purposes of statutory damages and attorney fees under the Copyright
Act, ‘publication’ refers to the copyright owner’s actions, not those of
the alleged infringer. Stated another way, ‘an act that commences
infringement does not publish an otherwise unpublished work.’ Zito v.
Steeplechase Films, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1022, 1026 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
See also 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on
Copyright § 4.04 at 4–22 to 4–23 (2002) (‘Congress could not have
intended that the various legal consequences of publication under the
current Act would be triggered by an unauthorized act of an infringer or
other stranger to the copyright.’)”).
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Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Pub. Bldg. Comm’n of Chi.,
320 F. Supp. 1303, 1311–13 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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Id.
111
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film is merely shown, it falls under the public performance
exception to publication. When copies of the film are
distributed—in hard copies or digitally—such distribution
amounts to publication.115 Perhaps the court was not
directed to the settled precedent indicating that digital
versions of copyrightable works are “copies” as defined by
federal copyright law.116 Posting digital copies online does
result in a “transfer of ownership” as defined under the
Act.117 Contrary to the Einhorn court’s suggestion, no sale
is required for publication to occur.118
To the extent that Einhorn contradicts Getaped, it is
the Getaped decision that is consistent with decades of
publication precedent, demonstrating that when a copyright
owner authorizes unrestricted distribution of copies to the
public, the work will be deemed published. Therefore,
unless something in the factual history of a work shows that
distribution was restricted or unauthorized, Internet
distribution will generally be deemed to constitute
publication.
Given the divergent conclusions about digital
distribution regarding publication, it remains critically
115

Am. Vitagraph, Inc. v. Levy, 659 F.2d 1023, 1027 (9th Cir. 1981)
(“An oft quoted modern definition of general publication is that
‘publication occurs when by consent of the copyright owner, the
original or tangible copies of a work are sold, leased, loaned, given
away, or otherwise made available to the general public, or when an
authorized offer is made to dispose of the work in any such manner
even if a sale or other such disposition does not in fact occur.’”)
(quoting 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, § 4.04 at 4-18, 4-19).
116
See 17 U.S.C. § 1001 (1992); London-Sire Records, Inc. v. Doe 1,
542 F. Supp. 2d 153, 171 (D. Mass. 2008).
117
Getaped.com, Inc. v. Cangemi, 188 F. Supp. 2d 398, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
2002) (“[T]he ability of the Internet user to download a file containing
a copyrighted work and thereby gain control of it, that is, gain a
proprietary or possessory interest in the copyrighted work.”).
118
See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).
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important to identify and plead facts to support the
publication status of a work.
A plaintiff claiming
publication online should identify the date on which the
work was first placed on a publicly accessible site. Without
the explicit claim that the site was public, the publication
allegation may be deemed insufficient.
One court found that an allegation of online
distribution is an insufficient claim of publication unless
the claimant specifies that the site was visible to the general
public.119 In Kernal Records Oy v. Mosley, a Norwegian
citizen composed a musical arrangement entitled
“Acidjazzed Evening.”120 Plaintiff claimed the work was
first published in Australia, and therefore fit the definition
of a foreign work that did not require the plaintiff to
register its copyright under U.S. law.121 The defendant
alleged that Internet publication constituted simultaneous
publication in the U.S., and therefore, the work did not
qualify for the registration exemption.122 The court’s
jurisdiction to hear the case turned on whether the online
distribution of the composition amounted to publication in
the United States.
Because the work was posted on the Internet, the
district court presumed simultaneous, worldwide
publication and dismissed the case finding it lacked
jurisdiction given that there had been no registration.123 On
119

Kernel Records Oy v. Mosley, 794 F. Supp. 2d 1355, 1368 (S.D.
Fla. 2011).
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1362–63.
122
Id. at 1364–68.
123
Id. at 1368 (“We hold that publishing AJE on a website in Australia
was an act tantamount to global and simultaneous publication of the
work, bringing AJE within the definition of a ‘United States work’
under § 101(1)(C) and subject to § 411(a)’s registration requirement.
Gallefoss elected to publish AJE on the Internet and the legal

Volume 60 – Number 1

36 IDEA – The Law Review of the Franklin Pierce Center for Intellectual Property
appeal, the Eleventh Circuit indicated that the presumption
that Internet distribution amounts to publication was
erroneous.124 The court explained: “[T]he terms ‘Internet’
and ‘online’ include alternatives to the use of a public
website, including a restricted website, e-mail, or a peer-topeer network. Such general and ambiguous deposition
testimony, without the inclusion of specific facts, is
insufficiently probative to demonstrate that there was no
dispute of material fact.”125 Despite this fundamental
criticism of the district court’s reasoning, its summary
judgment decision was affirmed because Plaintiff “failed to
produce sufficiently probative evidence of Acidjazzed
Evening being a foreign work exempt from registration.”126
An important lesson can be drawn from this decision:
future litigants should expressly indicate whether their
online distribution was publicly accessible. Although the
defendant offered evidence that the work was posted
online, the evidence did not clarify whether the site was
open to the public.
consequences of that decision must apply. Plaintiff was therefore
required to register AJE prior to seeking judicial enforcement of its
copyright rights.”)
124
Id. at 1305–06 (“Although it may be possible to presume
simultaneous worldwide availability of a public website, . . . such a
presumption could not apply to restricted websites, peer-to-peer
networks, and e-mail. A restricted website is only available to those
willing to pay a fee or who meet specified criteria; a peer-to-peer
network is only available to those who have downloaded the required
software; and an e-mail only goes to the addresses input by the sender.
Thus, unlike public websites on the World Wide Web, each of these
other methods of online distribution would be inconsistent with a
presumption of simultaneous worldwide availability. . . . The district
court then erroneously assumed all ‘Internet publication’ results in
simultaneous, worldwide distribution. As outlined below, a proper
separation of the terms yields a very different analysis.”) (citations
omitted).
125
Id. at 1308.
126
Id. at 1311.
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As illustrated above in Einhorn, authorization by
the copyright owner is another important piece of the
publication puzzle.127 When a copyright owner distributes a
work or authorizes a distribution, that authorization is an
important factor leading to a conclusion of publication.
When a copyright owner posts a work on a publicly
available Internet site, the posting constitutes copyright
publication because the general public has unrestricted
access to digital copies. Judges should no longer have to
throw up their hands in frustration or avoid the publication
issue by deferring to the ministerial decision of registration
made without access to all the relevant facts.128
When a work has been posted by the copyright
owner on a publicly available site, both the statutory
definition and the overwhelming weight of copyright
precedent support a finding that the work has been
published. Therefore, the moment a work is posted on
social media or a public website, it has been published as a
matter of copyright law. Some courts have seen through
the ambiguity in publication doctrine to set helpful
precedent regarding Internet publication. For example, the
court in Wright v. Buzzfeed correctly concluded that a
copyright owner’s posting of her work on Instagram
constitutes publication.129 Courts and the U.S. Copyright
Office should not hesitate to draw this conclusion that is
compelled by decades of precedent.
Whether the
127

Einhorn v. Mergatroyd Prods., 426 F. Supp. 2d 189, 191–93
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
128
Rogers v. Better Bus. Bureau of Metro. Houston, Inc., 887 F. Supp.
2d 722, 732–33 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
129
Wright v. Buzzfeed, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-02187-CAS (AFMx), 2018
WL 2670642, at *3 (C.D. Cal. June 4, 2018) (concluding that plaintiff
is not entitled to statutory damages or attorney’s fees on two of her
claims because (1) the alleged infringement pre-dated
her copyright registration; and (2) the copyright was not registered
within three months of first publication).
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distribution constitutes limited publication or no
publication at all raises a legitimate question of fact only if
(1) someone other than the copyright owner posted the
work; (2) the site was not publicly available and the content
was not authorized for further distribution; or (3) members
of the public could view the content but not download
digital copies.130 The following section provides a standard
to help future copyright registrants and litigants decide
when online distribution does and does not amount to
copyright publication.
V.

INTERNET PUBLICATION INDICATORS

The following standard should be used to determine
whether a work has been published through distribution on
the Internet and, specifically for copyright purposes, a work
placed on the Internet should be considered published if the
facts reflect the following three factors: (1) the work was
posted by the copyright owner or with the owner’s
permission; (2) the site was publicly accessible; and (3) the
public could download copies of the work.
Use of this standard will make it clear that Internet
posts on many websites will constitute publication if the
work was posted by the copyright owner or with the
owner’s consent. When a copyright owner posts content on
a website or social media site such as Facebook or
Instagram that permit users to create or download copies,
the work should be deemed published.
130

NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 12, § 4.07[B]; Palmer/Kane LLC v.
Gareth Stevens Publ’g, No. 1:15-CV-7404-GHW, 2017 WL 3973957,
at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 7, 2017) (“At the very least, the question of
whether the appearance of the Images on stockmarketphoto.com prior
to May 28, 1999 constituted ‘publication’ of the Images requires
resolution of factual disputes regarding the extent to which the website
was available to the general public and the purpose for which the
Images were posted.”).
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It is also important to remember that none of these
elements will independently establish that a work is
published. Take, for example, the first element involving
permission from the copyright owner. Such authorization
is important and generally leads to a finding of publication,
but it does not always do so.131 If a work is posted on a site
that is password-protected, encrypted, or otherwise closed
to the public, the second element cannot be established.
Although publication of the work may still be proven based
on other facts, the technological protection measures will
weigh against such a finding. If the distribution was
restricted to a select group who were not authorized to
distribute copies, the authorized distribution may be only a
limited publication, which is equivalent to no publication at
all. Such an authorized posting of a work on a site that is
not publicly accessible will likely amount to only limited
publication as such a distribution would be made to a
limited group for a limited purpose.
Similarly, posting a work on a publicly accessible
site is not by itself sufficient to constitute publication,
especially if the first element is not proven. If the post was
made without copyright owner authorization, the facts may
not support a finding of publication, especially if the
distribution was made by the defendant in the case being
decided.132
Nonetheless, a series of unauthorized
distributions may amount to publication especially when
the copyright owner does nothing to stop them.133
Therefore, authorization alone is insufficient to drive the
publication conclusion.
131

Deborah R. Gerhardt, Copyright Publication: An Empirical Study,
87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 135, 199–200 (2011).
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Neri v. Monroe, No. 11-cv-429-slc, 2014 WL 793336, at *10 (W.D.
Wis. Feb. 26, 2014), aff’d, 567 F. App’x 465 (7th Cir. 2014).
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Letter Edged in Black Press v. Public Building Comm’n of Chi., 320
F. Supp. 1303, 1309 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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